Regional benefits in federal project evaluations by Schramm, Gunter
REGIONAL BENEFITS IN FEDERAL PROJECT EVALUATIONS 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent, if any, regional 
income considerations should affect the selection, evaluation and scope of 
federal water resources  projects.  While the analysis  is l imited to this par t icu-  
lar  sector of federal activit ies,  the findings should be readily applicable to 
other federal expenditure categories.  The water resources  sector  was selected 
for two reasons:  F i r s t ,  it has ~:longer and more concise history of exacting 
evaluation standards than any other federal expenditure activity, and, second, 
in recent  months the U. S. Water Resources Council has developed a detailed 
new set of evaluation standards that deviate significantly from those applied 
until  now. If these standards were to be adopted in the water resources  field 
it is likely that they would be adopted for other federal expenditure categories 
as well, if only because of the undisputed leadership of the U. S. Federal  Water 
Resource Sector in the area  of the analysis  of the benefits and costs of public 
investment activities.  
What the U. S. Water Resources Council proposes is to set up a four-  
account system which would detail project  effects in t e rms  of (1) national in-  
come benefits and costs,  (2) environmental  quality, (3) social well-being, and 
(4) regional development objectives. 2 These four objectives would be cons id -  
ered to be of equal rank so that t rade-offs  among them could be contemplated. 
Regional benefits would be accounted for by, " increases  in a region 's  income, 
increases  in employment, and improvement of the economic base, environment,  
social well-being and other specified components of the regional income ob- 
jectives.  ,3 
The questions which we will t ry to ask and answer here are: 
(a) Whether  it is real ly appropriate for a federal  agency to consider 
regional in addition to federal  income objectives; 
(b) Given an affirmative answer to (a), whether an agency should be pe r -  
mitted to trade off favourable regional against net national income 
gains; 
(c) Given an affirmative answer to (a) and (b) whether the present ly  
1The author is Associate Professor  of Resource Economics at the Univer-  
sity of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  The paper was financially supported by the Ins t i -  
tute of Public Policy Studies and the School of Natural Resources of the Univer-  
sity of Michigan. 
2United States Water Resources Council, Standards for Planning Water 
and Land Resources,  Washington, D. C. ,  July 1970, pp. 11-7, 11-19. 
31bid., p. 11-17. 
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(d) 
existing national efficiency requi rement  of benef i t s /cos t  >.. is sti l l  a 
useful guide to project  selection; and 
Whether the definition of a region is a useful concept even if we 
accept regional income effects as a legitimate goal for federal p ro-  
ject  evaluations.  
As will be seen, the conclusions of this paper are quite sympathetic to 
the underlying objectives of the Water Resources  Council proposals .  However, 
significant doubts are ra i sed  about the efficacy of the proposed evaluation pro-  
cedures.  Alternative approaches are being suggested which hopefully will 
avoid some of the shortcomings of the proposed Water Resources  Council p ro-  
cedures.  
The Water Resources Council Proposals  
The original  1969 proposals of the Water Resources Council have under -  
gone several  significant modifications in specific details but not in overal l  con- 
ception. Thei r  key element  is embedded in the proposal to create a four-  
account system which would analyze project  objectives and effects under  the 
four headings as outlined above. 
While an analysis  of the Environmental  Quality and Social Well Being ob- 
ject ives are beyond the scope of this paper both of them are closely re la ted to 
the Regional Development one. In par t icular ,  it will be shown below that the 
key-componenf of the Social Well-Being Account--which is income red i s t r ibu-  
t i on - - r ea l ly  should be accounted for under the Regional Development objective 
(or vice versa) .  
Implementing the four-account  system would have several  important con- 
sequences. The f i rs t  would be that more information would be made available 
to the public and ul t imate decision makers .  Under the separate account head- 
ings a much more detailed presentat ion of project  consequences, both in t e r ms  
of monetary and non-monetary  benefits and costs,  would become necessary .  
Hopefully, this information would also be presented in such a form that the 
major  groups of people affected by the proposal  could be identified. Such a de- 
tailed presentat ion would cer tainly be highly beneficial  and help to improve the 
budget allocation and decision making process .  
Much less c lear ,  however, would be the effects of the four-account  sys-  
tem on both the goal formulat ion and final project  evaluation ~rocedures .  Instead 
of a single objective, namely national income maximizat ion,  ~ t h e r e  would no~v 
4This statement is an obvious oversimplif icat ion.  While national income 
maximizat ion was general ly the major  planning goal of the operating agencies,  
numerous other objectives were general ly  incorporated into the analysis  and 
ul t imate project  design. This was highly desirable  from the planning agency's  
point of view which always had to be concerned about its local consti tuency and 
project  supporters.  It also had found explicit  expression in the existing plan-  
ning guidelines such as Senate Document No. 97 which declared that, "All view- 
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be four major  groups of object ives which, in almost  all cases ,  would contain 
mutually exclusive elements .  These conflicts would have to be resolved on 
the basis  of some t rade-of f  functions which no longer could be expressed  in an 
unambiguous common denominator such as money. To solve this problem, 
severa l  a l ternat ive s t ra tegies  can be followed. Unfortunately, all have signifi-  
cant shortcomings.  One would be to provide executive and congressional  guide- 
l ines which would determine specific weights for each objective. Apart f rom 
the formidable task to devise a formula  that would be acceptable for the var ious 
congressional  and adminis t ra t ive  in teres t  groups, such a predetermined and 
uniform set of weights would be a ra ther  inefficient device,  given the d ivers i ty  
of wa te r - r e l a t ed  needs and r e sou rces  existing in the var ious  regions of the 
United States. A second al ternat ive,  which would impose fixed constraints  on 
each objective,  such as the imposition of environmental  standards or ,  for 
example,  the well-known condition that national efficiency benef i t -cost  ra t ios  
have to be equal or  g r ea t e r  than one, again is likely to lead to substantial inef- 
f ic iencies  since no information would become available about the marginal  
t rade-offs  or  costs  of these constraints  in t e rms  of all other object ives.  5 
The third a l ternat ive,  and the one apparently favoured by the Water Resources  
Council, is to leave it up to the individual planning agency to assess  the most  
appropriate weights in each individual case,  and to "se lec t  a recommended 
plan f rom among the a l ternat ives  based upon an evaluation of the t rade-ef f s  
among the var ious  object ives.  ,,6 While the net national income costs  of enhanc- 
ing the non-national income object ives would be indicated in the proposed ac-  
counting f ramework it is c lea r  that the planning agencies would have cons ider -  
able discret ion in the design, select ion and ~caling of individual pro jec t  objec-  
t ives.  It is also c lea r  that this would open the door widely for special  in teres t  
pleading at the agency level  and to potential account manipulations in response 
to such p ressu re  s . This very  rea l  danger is probably one of the major  reasons  
why the P res iden t ' s  Office of Management and Budget has refused so far  to 
accept the Water  Resources  Council proposals  in thei r  present  form.  7 
While these are ve ry  rea l  and important  difficulties }t is not possible to 
points--nat ional ,  regional ,  state and loca l - - sha l l  be fully considered and taken 
into account in planning re source  use and development. ,, See, the P res iden t ' s  
Water  Resources  Council, Pol ic ies ,  Standards, and Procedures  in the Formula -  
tion, Evaluation and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water  and 
Related Land Resources, 87th Congress, 2d Session, May 29, 1962, p. 2. 
5For a more  detailed discussion of this point see Gunter Schramm and 
Robert  E. Burt,  J r . ,  An Analysis of Federa l  Water Resource Planning and 
Evaluation Procedures ,  The Univers i ty  of Michigan, School of Natural Re-  
sources ,  Ann Arbor,  Michigan, June 1970. 
6U. S. Water Resources Council, Standards---, op. cit., July 1970, 
p. V-A-3. 
7Conservation Foundation Newsletter, January 1971, p. i0. 
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pursue them fur ther  within the context of this paper.  Given the topic under 
considerat ion here ,  our discussion must be l imited to the analysis of the 
appropria teness  of regional  income benefits  and cost evaluations in federal  
project  analysis.  The discussion will concentrate on monetary regional  income 
effects.  This s idesteps the thorny issue of comparisons  between monetary and 
non-monetary  goals and object ives.  In the r ea l  world, of course,  these i ssues  
could not be d is regarded  as the proposed Water  Resources  Council guidelines 
themselves  indicate. 8 
The Appropria teness  of Regional Income Accounting 
Federa l  investments  in water  r e sou rces  projects  inevitably have a s ignif i-  
cant income redis t r ibut ional  effect.  P ro jec t  benefits are  usually concentrated 
within a finite sub-national region. If they are  non-re imbursable  project  
benef ic ia r ies  enjoy the use of total pro jec t  benefits  without covering more  than 
a smal l  f ract ion of pro jec t  costs .  9 But even if they are  re imbursab le ,  the 
advantages of federal  financing with its long pay-out per iods ,  low interes t  ra tes  
and el imination of taxes bestow significant advantages on project  benef ic iar ies .  
There is l i t t le doubt that it would be useful to identify the net flow of 
r e s o u r c e s  within a region resul t ing f rom a proposed federal  project .  Given the 
significant impact of federal  expenditures on specific a reas  such a regional 
impact  accounting has become common pract ice  for quite a number of federal  
agencies,  most  prominently among them the Department of Defense. 10 
The more  ser ious  questions are whether federal  pro jec ts  should be 
specif ical ly designed or  redesigned for the purpose of influencing regional  in- 
come flows, or  whether the funding of authorized pro jec ts  should be influenced 
8See also footnote (2). 
9These costs  would, at most ,  be l imited to the fract ional  share of federal  
taxes that the benef ic ia r ies  contribute to the budget of the federal  water  r e -  
sources  construction agency. On an average per  capita basis  these tax cont r i -  
butions might be quite significant. For  the ten-s ta te  southeastern region,  for 
example,  Haveman has es t imated them to amount to approximately 41% of total 
benefits  rece ived  (Robert Haveman, Water Resource  Investment and the Public 
Interest ,  Vanderbilt  Univers i ty  P r e s s ,  Nashville,  Tenn. ,  1965, Table 14). 
However, benefits are far  from evenly distributed among the inhabitants of a 
region or  state which means that some individuals would be net gainers  and 
others net lose rs .  Fu r the rmore ,  it would be more  sensible to assume that the 
el imination of any one federal  water r e sources  project  would not lead to any 
decline in federal  tax ra tes .  Hence, the actual cost contributions of pro jec t  
benef ic iar ies  would rea l ly  be equal to zero.  
i0 
See for example: 
Feb. 14, 1970. 
"How Peace will Cut Employment, " Business Week, 
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by regional  income considerat ions.  11 Since many more  projects  are authorized 
than are funded in any given year  12 such a select ion pattern could have an im-  
portant income redis tr ibut ional  effect. 
Let us look at the possible rat ionale of the la t ter  procedure  f i rs t .  It is 
obvious that such a policy would reduce total potential national income even if 
all authorized projects  would be built eventually. Choosing a project  with a 
lower benef i t -cost  rat io in p re fe rence  to one with a higher one would necessa r i ly  
produce lower near- fu ture  net additions to income for  the nation as a whole. 
Since ear ly  net income s t r eams  have a higher present  value than la te r  ones 
total national income would be permanently reduced. Because of this aspect  of 
apparent inefficiency many prominent economists  such as Musgrave,  for 
example, have argued against the inclusion of income distributional cons idera-  
tions into benef i t -cos t  analysis.  13 Instead, they recommend to deal with in- 
come distributional problems only through the tax-cash  t rans fe r  mechanism.  
However, it is not too difficult to show that this view represen t s  a ra ther  
s implis t ic ,  and hence Incorrec t  view of the world. There  is l i t t le doubt that 
the marginal  income utili ty functions of most  individuals have a downward slope, 
even if a lmost  all welfare economists  will  concede that the actual location and 
slope of these functions cannot be determined.  By and large,  however,  t h e r e  is 
general  agreement  among the member s  of our society that an additional dollar  
of income, on average,  has a higher uti l i ty to a low income than to a high in- 
come person.  F rom this it follows that a project  I with a lower benef i t -cost  
rat io might be as efficient in t e rms  of total utility than a project  II with a 
l lSuch  a procedure appears to be followed to some extent by Congress.  
As var ious obse rve r s  have pointed out, the funding of authorized water  r e -  
sources  pro jec ts  follows no consistent  pattern with respec t  to rankings by na- 
tional efficiency c r i t e r i a ,  although it appears  to have an income red i s t r ibu-  
tional bias towards lower income regions (See also R. Haveman, op. cit. 
Chpt. IV). Some analysts have gone so far  as to conclude that this r ep resen t s  
a del iberate congressional  income redis tr ibut ional  policy. See Burton A. 
Weisbrod, "Income Redistribution Effects and Benef i t -Cost  Analysis , ' ,  in 
Samuel B. Chase, ed . ,  Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis,  The Brook-  
ings Institution, Washington, 1968. 
12In recent  years ,  for  example,  average annual Army Corps of Engineers  
construction expenditures amounted to about 1.2 billion dol lars  while the ul t i -  
mate federal  costs of all authorized projects  amounts to over  23 billion dol lars ,  
From: Conservation Foundation Newslet ter ,  Jan. 1971, p. 2. 
13See Richard A. Musgrave,  "Cost -Benef i t  Analysis and the Theory of 
Public Finance, ', The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. VII, No. 3, Sept. 
1969, pp. 803-805. While Musgrave acknowledges the possibility that income 
transfers in kind might be more desirable from the community's point of view, 
he still maintains that this solution is "second best in the absence of political 
constraints. " (p. 804). 
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higher one as long as the rat ios  of their  respect ive per  capita regional benefi t -  
cost ra t ios  are equal to the inverse rat ios  of the respective average of the m a r -  
ginal income ut i l i t ies  of all project  beneficiar ies .  14 Musgrave 's  prescr ip t ion 
would be to build project  II, to tax its benef ic iar ies  and to redis t r ibute  income 
to individuals in project  I area,  since such a procedure v~uld maximize total 
income and, after redis tr ibut ion,  also total utility. However, such a p r e sc r i p -  
tion is totally unreal is t ic ,  given our existing governmental  and organizational 
s t ructure .  If project  II were to be built ,  there would be no feasible way to tax 
its benef ic iar ies  in favour of the potential benef ic iar ies  of project  I. Conse- 
quently, a project  selection policy that would take account of and adjust for in-  
come distr ibutional  consequences may well be more rat ional  and efficient in 
t e rms  of overall  welfare than one which concentrates  only on national efficiency 
maximization.  
However, this conclusion holds only if the income distr ibutional  conse-  
quences of the var ious al ternative projects  are known. As we will see below, 
it is not enough to ascer ta in  that a par t icular  project  will have its main impact 
in a low-income region. What must  be established, in addition, is that the 
project  benefits real ized within that region will actually go to low-income, 
ra ther  than middle or high income groups. This important caveat will be d is -  
cussed in grea ter  detail below. 
Let us now turn  to the second issue,  namely the question whether individ- 
ual project  designs should be changed in order  to br ing about net additions to 
regional  benefits,  even if such a redesign would resul t  in a reduction of net 
national income benefits.  According to the WRC proposals the answer to this 
question is an unqualified "yes , "  provided the regional income benefits appear 
to be desirable .  15 For  instance, in one of its i l lustrat ive examples the WRC 
details and recommends acceptance of a fictional project  whose national income 
benefi t -cost  ratio would be equal to 0.77, while its regional  benefi t -cost  ratio,  
including secondary income benefits ,  would amount to 2.92.16 If we accept 
the v iew--and at least  the author of this paper would tend to do so-- that  income 
distr ibutional  effects towards lower income groups tend to increase  total 
national welfare then no d i r ec t  objections can be ra ised  against such a t rade-off  
between national and regional  income objectives. However, what is needed 
141. E. (BI/CI)uI = (BH/CII)u II, or (BI/CI)/(BII/c II) = UII /u  I where 
(BI/C I) and (BII/cII)are the respect ive regional benefi t -cost  rat ios per  capita 
for projects  I and II and U I and U H represen t  the average of the marginal  in-  
come uti l i t ies  of project  benef ic iar ies  in the two project  areas .  
15 
U. S. Water Resources Council, S tandards - - - ,  July 1970, pp. VII-4-1 
to VII-5-10. 
16 
Ibid., pp. VII-4-1 to VII-4-5. 
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again is a c lea r  identification of the actual benef ic iary  groups by income c l a s -  
ses so that it can be established that these regional  benefits rea l ly  accrue to 
lower income groups. Only if they do can a case be made for a t rade-of f  
between national and regional  income object ives.  
The Rationale of a Minimum National Income Benef i t -Cost  Ratio 
Until now authorization of any project  r equ i red  that the national income 
benef i t -cos t  ra t io  had to be at least  equal to one. This well establ ished rule  
makes l i t t le sense if we accept the view that other than national income objec-  
t ives should be considered in federal  pro jec t  analysis.  Let us demonstrate .  
In Figure (1) ABCDEFGHJK represen t s  a f icti t ious p ro jec t ' s  t rade-of f  function 
between net national and net regional  income benefits .  The la t ter  are  posi t ive 
throughout while the f o r m e r  are  f i r s t  negative (below B), r i s e  to a maximum 
(between C and D), subsequently fall  to zero (at F), and then turn negative 
while regional  net benefits stil l  increase  (up to J). Beyond J regional  net 
benefits also decline. Ia, Ib, and I c r ep resen t  var ious  possible social  welfare  
functions. I a r ep resen t s  the c lass ica l  national efficiency approach while I b will 
resul t  in the acceptance of some, and I c of ve ry  substantial t rade-offs  between 
net national and net regional  income goals.  
It is immediately apparent that the segments  f rom A to D and from J to 
K represen t  infer ior  a l ternat ives  in the c lass ica l  Pareto  sense since there  are  
other solutions which resu l t  in a higher net benefit  to at least  one of the objec-  
t ives without requir ing a reduction in the net benefit  to the other.  If I a r e p r e -  
sents the decision make r ' s  social  welfare function he will be indifferent between 
points C and D (where the t rade-of f  funct ionhas  a horizontal  slope). P r e s u m -  
ably he will  choose D over  C since nothing must be sacr i f iced in t e rms  of net 
national income gains while D is super ior  to C in t e r m s  of net regional  income. 
Let us now impose the usual res t r i c t ion  that the national income benefits 
must be at least  equal to or  g rea t e r  than national income costs .  This l imits  
the t rade-of f  function to the segment BCDEF. Now, if the decision m a k e r ' s  
welfare function is represented  by I b he will choose point E since at this point 
the constrained segment of the t rade-of f  function is just tangent to his highest 
welfare indifference curve I~. However, it can be seen that in the absence of 
the constraint  he would in fact choose I~ which is tangent to the t rade-of f  func- 
tion at point G where net national income benefits are  negative. Similar ly,  
if the social  welfare function has to be represen ted  by I c the B/C >/ 1 
constraint  would force the selection of point F while in the unconstrained case 
point H would be much more  desirable.  
What we must conclude, therefore ,  is that the imposition of absolute con- 
straints ,  such as minimum benef i t -cos t  ra t ios ,  makes l i t t le sense if object ives 
other than national income maximizat ion are to be included in the analysis.  
The Concept and Limitations of a Regional Account 
Major difficulties arise in defining the relevant region for the project 
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accounting areas  ''17 and to analyze regional  project  effects  within this p r e - d e -  
termined regional  f ramework.  As the Council states: 
A plan may have effects on one or  more  of the economic accounting 
a reas .  As many economic accounting areas  as necessa ry  will be 
included in o rder  to cover  the geographic a rea  re levant  to the evalua-  
tion of the regional  development objective.  - - - - I t  is not proposed that 
the effects of a plan be identified ac ross  all  of the individual account- 
ing a r e a s - - - .  The evaluation will, however,  as a minimum, analyze 
the effects of a plan upon the geographic a rea  re levant  to the evalua-  
tion of the regional  development objective and the r e s t  of the Nation. 18 
Such a flexible accounting f ramework  will se rve  a useful purpose in iden- 
tifying major  pro jec t  impacts by geographic-economic sub-areas .  It must be 
recognized,  however,  that most  of the l a rge r  water  r e sources  projects  will 
have impacts on widely differing areas .  Irr igat ion,  water  supply and pollution 
abatement effects  are likely to be t ied closely to the local region in which the 
project  is located. Large water  s torage and flood protection projec ts ,  on the 
other hand, may affect the water  reg ime  of the whole downstream reach of a 
r i ve r  which could t r ave r se  quite a number of the proposed economic accounting 
areas .  While these projec t  benefits would at least  occur  within close geographic 
proximity  to the water  course ,  o thers ,  such as e lec t r ic  power or  recrea t ion  
may not. They may, instead, affect quite a different and of ten- t imes  non- 
contiguous group of economic-geographic  accounting regions.  19 The definition 
of the appropriate region will become even more  complicated if the impacts of 
project  costs  and cost  r e imbursement s  are  taken into account. In case of the 
la t ter ,  for example,  tax-financed regional  r e imbursement s  are  often paid out 
of state taxes so that the regional  impact  of a project  may extend to all tax-  
payers  of a given state. 20 As a consequence it is likely that any attempt to 
17These are  identical to the OBERS economic project ion areas  developed 
by the Department of Commerce .  
18U. S. Water Resources  Council, Standards . . . .  . July 1970, o p. ci___t., 
p. VI-3. 
19For example,  a survey of the potential impact of a major  recrea t iona l  
development on the middle Susquehanna River  in Pennsylvania found that the 
area  was within four-hour  driving distance of more than 25 mill ion people. 
This would mean that a substantial portion of the non-pr iced recrea t iona l  bene-  
fits f rom the Pennsylvania development would accrue to people living in New 
York, Newark, Bal t imore ,  and other outside metropoli tan areas .  
20Given the cos t - shar ing  formulas  applying to recrea t iona l  developments,  
for  example,  the above mentioned Susquehanna River  rec rea t ion  development 
would resu l t  in substantial net benefits to rec rea t ion i s t s  f rom New York State, 
New Je r s ey ,  Delaware and Maryland, while a substantial portion of the 50% 
re imbursement  requi rements  would be paid out of State of Pennsylvania taxes.  
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define the relevant  region on the basis  of the WRC proposals will resul t  in a 
conglomerate of disparate economic accounting areas ,  many of which are tied 
together only on the bas is  of one but certainly not all project  outputs or effects. 
On the other hand, the analysis  might be l imited to ',the geographic area  
re levant  to the evaluation of the regional  development objective. ,,21 Such a 
procedure would almost  invariably resul t  in a strong bias towards the counting 
of favourable regional  effects, while offsetting disadvantageous consequences 
occurr ing elsewhere would be disregarded.  22 
The question which must  be ra i sed  then, is whether these geographic 
regions could serve any useful purpose for the assessment  of the mer i t s  
of creat ing special regional  net benefits that wculd require  a net reduction in 
national benefits or a net  increase  in national costs.  It is easy to see that the 
answer to this question must  be negative. As we have seen above, net reduc-  
tions in national income in favour of regional objectives can be justified only in 
t e rms  of increases  in total util i ty or total welfare. This means that all, or at 
least  a large proportion of the additional regional  benefits must  go to low- 
income or otherwise disadvantaged groups. Few, if any, water resource 
projects  have much specific income-redis t r ibut ional  effects. For  example, a 
new i r r iga t ion  project  in a low-income area may resul t  in a significant expan- 
sion of economic activity and per capita income, but may not help the low- 
income disadvantaged group residing in the area at all if the benefic iar ies  are 
newly established f a rmer s  that have been attracted from elsewhere. In such a 
case, the so-cal led regional  net benefits represent  no more than a direct  t r a n s -  
fer of economic activity from one area to another. Regional increases  in 
economic activity, therefore,  can be counted only as special regional benefits 
if they actually affect the economic fortunes of the specific disadvantaged 
groups living in the region. What is needed in addition to the regional account- 
ing framework, therefore,  is an analysis  of the actual impact of project  effects 
on specific people and groups of people. Only if these impacts can be es tab-  
lished and measured  is it possible to decide upon the real  mer i t s  of proposed 
trade-offs  between national and regional  income objectives. 
The Impact Accounting System--An Alternative Proposal 
While the economic development of lagging regions has become a major  
policy objective for the Federal  government in recent  years  23 it must  be 
21See also footnote (18). 
22For example, the favourable regional construction employment effects 
of a hydropower project  might be counted as a benefit,  while the likely much 
grea ter  deleterious effects on employment levels in depressed coal mining 
areas  (which would have supplied thermal  power plants in the absence of the 
hydro project) would more often than not be disregarded. 
23See, for example, the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 
1965 (Public Law 89-136) and the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 
1965. 
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recognized that the underlying objective of regional  development is less  con- 
cerned with the fortunes or  misfor tunes  of a region as such than with the fo r -  
tunes or misfor tunes  of the people living within it. Hence, regional  develop- 
ment goals a re  p r imar i ly  development goals for people, not for regions.  To 
the extent that federal  water  r e sou rces  projects  will  fur ther  such regional 
development goals they can do it only by improving direct ly  or  indirectly the 
economic well-being of the disadvantaged groups living within these regions.  
What is needed, therefore ,  is an analysis of the total net economic impact of 
such projects  on these groups, r a ther  than an accounting f ramework  which 
identifies no more  than the aggregate regional  economic effects.  24 
Several  steps are  needed to provide the necessa ry  information. The f i r s t  
is the drawing up of a national income maximizat ion plan which excludes any 
special  allowance for other objectives.  Such a plan is needed even if it is 
quite cer ta in  f rom the outset that other goals,  such as regional  income enhance- 
ment,  will be of ma jo r  importance for the final plan selection.  The uncon-  
strained national income maximizat ion plan is needed to measure  the costs of 
the other object ives in t e rms  of foregone national income net benefits.  25 In 
this way a shadow pr ice  can be establ ished for them. 
The second step is the analysis  of future developments in the "without" 
case. This analysis is important for severa l  reasons .  The f i r s t  and most  
obvious one is that it will prevent  the inclusion of the net benefits of develop- 
ments that will take place in the absence of the project  as par t  of project  
24Construction expenditures provide a typical example.  L e g i s l a t o r s - -  
par t icular ly  at election t i m e - - a r e  fond to quote the total dollar  costs of water  
r e sources  projects  which are being built within their  election dis t r ic t .  How- 
ever ,  as Haveman and Kruti l la as well as others  have shown, only some 15-40% 
of total construction expenditures rea l ly  r ep resen t  local expenditures.  The 
balance goes to outside suppliers .  Of local expenditures,  most go to const ruc-  
tion labor. But construction labor is highly special ized,  highly unionized and 
highly mobile. Most of the construction site labor requi rements  will  be fi l led 
by construction workers  from outside the region. If the region is permanently 
economically depressed  it is unlikely to contain many members  of the requi red  
skilled construction t rades .  At best ,  therefore,  the region i tself  will supply 
the unskilled labor force ,  whose wages general ly do not account for more than 
3-7% of total construction expenditures.  If we accept Haveman's  and Krut i l la ' s  
view that even at high unemployment ra tes  the likelihood of drawing f rom the 
unemployed labor pool is less  than 100%~ then it can be seen that the d i rec t  
local employment effect of a construction project  might be very small  indeed. 
Data from: Robert  H. Haveman and Jolm V. Krutilla, U!~employment ,Idle 
Capacity and the Evaluation of Public Expenditures,  Johns Hopkins, 
Bal t imore ,  1968, Table 6. 
25The total costs  consist  of the sum of the separable costs and the net 
reduction in national income benefits attributable to the introduction of the 
non-national income objective.  
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benefits. The second reason is a managerial one. Our water resources 
agencies no longer are (or at least should be) simply project oriented construc- 
tion agencies, but rather management agencies with a comprehensive responsi- 
bility for the most beneficial management of our water resources. The decision 
not to build a project at a particular site, therefore, is as important a manage- 
ment decision as to build one, and it will result in a flow of social benefits and 
costs that must be carefully accounted for. The third reason for the detailed 
analysis of the "without" case is most directly related to the proposed impact 
accounting system. By tracing the flows and impacts of the benefits and costs 
occurring in the without case it will be possible to assess the net differential 
of these benefRs and costs as they occur to the respective groups affected by 
them. In other words, the detailing of the "without" case consequences allow 
the measurement of the opportunities foregone. 
In order to measure the likely incidence of project effects both the cost 
and benefit flows of the income maximization plan and the "without" analysis 
must be traced and presented in as much detail as possible. In many cases, 
and par t icular ly  in those in which trade-offs  between national and regional  ob- 
jectives are contemplated, special information, such as unemployment ra tes  
and incidence, employment categories and others would have to be provided. 
Once all the information that appears to be relevant  has been collected and 
presented al ternative plans which include specific regional deirelopment goals 
can be drawn up. These plans have to provide the same impact information as 
the unconstrained national development plan. Such a presentat ion will allow a 
ready comparison of all  project  effects. It will permi t  a detailed analysis  of 
the national efficiency losses resul t ing from the inclusion of regional develop- 
ment goals, and it will permi t  the t racing of the incidence of project  benefits 
mid costs.  Only, and only if this information is provided in sufficient detail 
can a rat ional  decision be made whether specific regional objectives mer i t  a 
t rade-off  in t e rms  of national efficiency losses.  Without this information, the 
so-cal led mer i t s  of regional development goals would simply become another 
grab-bag for federal  funds that serve no other purpose than to enrich some in-  
fluential regional  in teres t  groups. 
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